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ABSTRACT
The role of music in music education research: Reflections on musical experience
First in this article the role of theories of musicology in music education research is 
considered. Second, the case in point is examined where the focus of music education 
research is brought to bear directly on music education, to wit music. By concentrating 
on music in music education research, the focus remains firmly on musical experience 
as a basis of reflection in music education research. The author has chosen to focus 
in particular on a specific kind of musical experience – more precisely, musical 
experience as an existential experience.
Keywords: music educational research, role of music, musical experience, existential 
experience
In this article my contribution to the discussion about the role of music in music education 
research falls into two parts. First, I consider the role of theories of musicology in music 
education research. Second, I examine the case in point where the focus of music education 
research is brought to bear directly on music education, to wit music (Nielsen 1997). By 
concentrating on music in music education research, the focus remains firmly on musical 
experience as a basis of reflection in music education research. I have chosen to focus in 
particular on a specific kind of musical experience – more precisely, musical experience 
as an existential experience.
Musicological theorising and music education research
Music education centres on the philosophy, theory, and study of individuals, music, 
society, and teaching and learning, and not least the relationship between these elements. 
Music education as a scholarly subject is multi-disciplinary in the extreme. This means 
that, as music education researchers, we can draw on any number of so-called ‘hyphen 
disciplines’ and sub-disciplines that come under the aegis of education or pedagogy as 
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an academic subject, and on music as both an academic subject and an art form. For 
example, we can approach music education from psychological, sociological, anthropological, 
and philosophical angles. These approaches in turn influence our chosen focus in 
both education and music, such that we can talk about educational–psychological and 
music–psychological perspectives, for example, or educational–philosophical and 
music–philosophical perspectives, and so on.
Given that music education is able to look to the theoretical foundations of 
both disciplines – education and music – the development of music education as an 
academic subject can in many ways been seen to mirror developments in both education 
and musicology. If, for the sake of argument, we limit ourselves to the latter, we will 
see that over the course of the last hundred years musicology has developed strongly 
in the direction of increasing specialisation. This means that in today’s musicology 
we encounter a multiplicity of directions or foci: everything from music history and 
analytic studies of style to music–philosophical, psychological, sociological and 
anthropological research.
Today we draw a distinction between historical and systematic musicology. Whilst 
historical musicology for the main part limits itself to musical objects, documents, and 
sources, systematic musicology encompasses a number of composite disciplines: music 
anthropology, music ethnology, music sociology, music psychology, music philosophy, 
music aesthetics, music therapy, and music education. There have been several attempts 
to create a schematic overview of musicology’s main and secondary fields. However, no 
such attempt can be considered realistic if the various fields are seen in isolation from one 
another. Historical research, for example, is hard to imagine without systematic elements, 
and every form of systematic musicology can of course be seen in terms of its historical 
context. Ingmar Bengtsson (1980) lists four main fields in musicology:
a)  Works with an emphasis on musical objects, documents, and sources. This 
includes research on instruments, notation, and music iconography (pictorial 
representations of music), as well as bibliographical and documentation research. 
b)  Works that centre on sound, sound progression, and reactions to sound. This 
category includes research on acoustics, the physiology of hearing and vocal 
production, instruments, musicality, and audio perception or ‘tone psychology’ 
(not to be confused with music psychology).
c)  Works with an emphasis on the relationship between music and human beings, 
society, and ideas. Included here are music anthropology, music philosophy, 
music aesthetics, music education, and music therapy.
d)  Works with a focus on music as expression and/or structure. This field includes 
research on audio and tone systems, musical grammar, musical rules and 
composition techniques, style analysis, and behavioural practice, and the 
description and interpretation of compositions.
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It is perhaps in the third of Bengtsson’s fields (c) that we should look for many, if not all, 
of the links between music education and musicology. Music anthropology and music 
ethnology examine the function and meaning of music in different epochs and cultures; 
music sociology reveals the role of music in different societies; music psychology is 
concerned with experience; music philosophy focuses on the relationship between music 
and Weltanschauung, often in terms of religious and ideological ideas; music aesthetics 
works with the ‘contents’, ‘meaning’, ‘essence’, and ‘significance’ of music, as well its 
critical assessment; while music therapy employs music as a ‘healing agent’ in mental 
health care and clinical treatments (Bengtsson 1980, Ruud 1992).
 What is often called ‘New Musicology’ embraces much of this, given that it accords 
the greatest weight to the relationship between music and human beings, society, and 
ideas. The most important consequence of ‘New Musicology’ has undoubtedly been the 
debate on what is actually meant by music, and the renewed interest in music’s function for 
individuals and society at large. The shift in music anthropology away from non-Western 
cultures to a fresh consideration of local and sub-cultures close to hand, and attempts to 
interpret the meaning of music and music experience in different cultures, makes this 
musicological field particularly important in any attempt to determine the ‘essence’, 
‘meaning’, ‘value’, and ‘importance’ of music – and similarly in reflections on music 
education. Music anthropology’s fundamentally value–relativistic agenda is especially 
relevant for any discussion of the function of music in music teaching. This much can be 
seen in the groundwork it offers music teaching, especially when it comes to assessing the 
centrality of so-called ‘everyday experiences’, here equated with ars et scientia – music 
as art and science (see, for example, Nielsen 1994:103ff., Ruud 1992, Stige 1995). In this 
lies an understanding that music teaching cannot only depend on the foundations of the 
performing and creative disciplines of the art partnered with musicology, but must also 
draw on central everyday experiences with music and song: the first interaction between 
mother and child; the musical play of the preschool child; and the experience of 
recreational music. Furthermore, it embodies a view of music as an activity and process, 
and not solely as a composition or product – a realisation that has proved crucial to music 
education philosophy and practice. This emphasis on music as an activity and process is, 
moreover, one of the distinguishing marks of much that passes for ‘New Musicology’, as 
many of us know from David Elliott’s works (1995, 1996), for example. Other aspects of 
‘New Musicology’ include a sense that music is closely linked to human feelings and the 
experience of meaning; that it is a natural, social activity in which participation is central; 
that it is determined by culture and context; that it is practiced, improvised, and ‘live’ as 
well as notated and reproduced; and that it is a personal, tangible, and profoundly human 
form of expression.
 All these issues are addressed in Christopher Small’s book Musicking. Small (1998) 
takes the traditional questions about the nature, meaning, and function of music in people’s 
lives and refocuses on the specific question of what is involved in the performance of given 
work, at a given time and place, and with given participants, or, as he puts it, ‘What does 
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it mean to participate in a performance of Western concert music in a concert hall in a 
European city at the end of the twentieth century?’ (Small 1998:16). In short, his central 
question is, ‘What’s really going on here?’ (Small 1998:14). By taking the concept of 
‘music’ in the direction of ‘musicking’, Small’s wish is to underline the fact that ‘music’ 
is to participate in a musical performance, be it as a performer, listener, practitioner, 
composer, or dancer; the main point being that ‘musicking’, through the social construction 
of meaning, becomes a ritual in which all participants explore and celebrate relationships 
that constitute their social identity. As Small writes:
Again, if we think about music primarily as action rather than as thing and about the 
action as concerned with relationships, then we see that whatever meaning a musical 
work has lies in the relationships that are brought into existence when the piece 
is performed. These relationships are of two kinds: those between the sounds that 
are made in response to the instructions given in the score and those between the 
participants in the performance. These two sets of relationships … are themselves 
related, in complex and always interesting second-order ways. (Small 1998:138–139).
All ‘musicking’ is to be regarded as a process in which we tell ourselves stories about 
our relationships and ourselves. All activity that we call art is therefore necessarily about 
human relationships. However, Small is open to the idea that such ‘relations’ stretch far 
beyond actual relationships and ‘everyday’ occurrences. The answer to the question ‘What’s 
really going on here?’, is thus, rightly enough, that it is an exploration and celebration 
of relationships, and, moreover, not only the relationships that actually exist in our lives.
During a musical performance, any musical performance anywhere and at any time, 
desired relationships are brought into virtual existence so that those taking part are 
enabled to experience them as if they really did exist. (Small 1998:183). 
‘Musicking’ is therefore just as much about relationships we wish existed and long to 
experience. It can be about relationships between people, between people and the cosmos, 
with us and within ourselves, with our physical bodies, or with the divine. It is in this way 
‘musicking’ acquires clear existential overtones.
 In considering the role of musicology theories in music education research, my 
principal focus is determined by the ever-growing musicological (anthropological and 
philosophical) insight into music. I have chosen to focus on this particular aspect of 
musicology not because it is the only contribution from this quarter that can, and should, 
play a role in music education research, but because I would claim that the approach to 
music to be found in Small’s work is of fundamental significance for both music education 
research and music education philosophy or practice, and that this type of musicological 
deliberation is especially relevant when dealing with a new figure on the music education 
scene – the anthropological perspective. 
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 At this point, however, it is also worthwhile considering a different way of linking music 
education and musicology. In the book Form och funktion, the Swedish musicologist Sten 
Dahlstedt (2007) analyses the music teacher education on offer at the Royal Academy of Music 
in Stockholm from the end of the 1940s until the reform of Swedish education policy in 
1976. Of particular relevance to the present context is his use of two musicological terms, 
‘form’ and ‘function’, as central to his argument. Dahlstedt makes the case that views on 
music education in the 1950s and 1960s were an expression of a particular intellectual, 
modernist aesthetic, of which the defining interest was ‘form’, as is evident in the student 
music teachers’ curriculum for music history and music theory, a curriculum designed 
to reflect the latest, most scientific methods. Moreover, he shows how the concept of 
‘function’ broke through in earnest in the 1960s, how this anthropological and sociological 
notion played an important role for the liberation of musical forms other than traditional 
Western art music, and how the artistic avant-garde, media, and new Left shared a desire 
for a new concept of culture to counteract ideas about the autonomy of art and abstract 
form. The point here is the possibility of understanding music teacher education in terms 
of concepts that most certainly relate to musicology. 
 Thus far I have argued that musicological theorising is an obvious element in music 
education, both as a discipline and as a field of research, and that music education is a 
distinct field that can make use of both educational and musicological theories. It will 
not have gone unnoticed, however, that ‘music education’ in fact exists as one of several 
subjects in Ingmar Bengtsson’s musicology categories. At this point, we are no longer 
talking about musicological theory being present in music education research, but rather 
that music education research is in principle a type of musicological activity. This is a 
large step towards a discussion of ‘who owns whom’, of which subject designations are 
superior to others, and so on. For example, is music education in principle an educational 
or a musicological discipline? Or is music education a higher discipline – and, for us, a 
superior and autonomous subject – that to varying degrees can be linked to educational 
and musicological theories?
 This is about far more than concepts. This is a struggle for the power of definition; a 
struggle between different professions (educationalists, musicologists, and music teachers) 
to determine who will set the research agenda, and equally a struggle that continues at 
the highest levels of principle, but also at the level of specific curricula. The questions to 
be faced include, ‘Should we teach our students a subject called ‘education’, or should 
it be called ‘music education?’, begging the question of whether this is a subject worth 
examining for power struggles.
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Musical experience as existential experience
If as music education researchers we wish to focus on music, we must necessarily 
concentrate on musical experience. Similarly, we have to be prepared to use the full 
spectrum of approaches to systematic musicology that might be relevant in under-
standing musical experience. In music education it is thus possible to tap into the 
communication between music and individual – in a multi-faceted way, in line with 
music’s multi-faceted world of lived experience. If we wish to focus on music we 
cannot, for example, be content to consider musical experience using approaches 
derived from learning and teaching situations alone, if only because the result would 
be research projects in which the educational element would stand out at the expense 
of the actual content of the educational process, that is to say the music.
 It is for this reason that I now turn to musical experience. Instead of talking around 
the subject, discussing how as music education researchers we can focus on, say, musical 
experience, I will offer a specific examination of musical experience as manifest in music 
education research. I have chosen to focus in particular on a certain type of musical 
experience, namely musical experience as an existential experience. As we shall see, this 
is not a novel theme, but I would argue that it is has been unfairly neglected when it comes 
to music education, both in the practical subject and in research.
 The phrase ‘musical experience as an existential experience’ refers to the full expression 
of musical experience in terms of what we might call the existential questions of life. 
Such questions can be said to be inherent to the human condition; we are all, sooner or 
later, confronted with questions that can seldom be answered with a categorical or precise 
answer. The question of meaning, both in life and of life, is perhaps paramount, but it 
is closely followed by the questions of human dignity, suffering, hope, time, death, joy, 
belonging, happiness, and coherence (Argyle 1992, Nordenfelt 1991a, 1991b, Veenhoven 
1984).
 I have taken as my starting point two factors that highlight both the anthropological 
and philosophical perspectives on musical experience. This is not to say that these two 
perspectives are the only ones possible, but I would argue that they are crucial if we are 
to focus on musical experience as an existential experience. The first factor is linked to 
the debate on what is music, and its functions for the individual and society, as mentioned 
earlier in the context of ‘musicking’. Small (1998), as we have seen, holds ‘musicking’ 
to be a process in which we tell ourselves stories about our relationships and ourselves. 
These ‘relations’, however, extend beyond that which exists in reality, in ‘everyday life’. 
‘Musicking’ embraces any and everything from interpersonal relationships to the physical 
realities of our own selves or a sense of the transcendental. What matters here is that 
Small thus gives the notion of ‘musicking’ clear existential overtones. I believe that it 
is particularly important to highlight the fact that such perspectives can also be found in 
newer anthropological approaches to musical experience, whilst acknowledging the 
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tendency toward reductionism both in cultural and educational thinking concerning musical 
experience, a reductionism that seems to exclude the possibility of existential experience. 
I will return to this later. 
 The second factor is linked to what Frede Nielsen refers to as music’s multi-faceted 
lifeworld. Nielsen (1994:133ff.) believes the ‘musical object’ is in essence a world of lived 
experience, a vast spectrum of experiential possibilities. In his account, music is seamed 
through with layers: an acoustic layer, a structural layer, a bodily layer, a tense layer, an 
emotional layer, and a spiritual or existential layer. Furthermore, he sees these layers of 
meaning as corresponding to the equivalent layers of human consciousness. Something 
in music corresponds with something in me. This means that the layers of meaning in 
music exist ‘only’ as potentialities, and that they are only first realised in the encounter 
with the experiencing subject. To follow this to its logical conclusion, music’s layers of 
meaning are analogous with the individual’s perception of acoustic data, and the processes 
of perceiving music with musical structure, experiencing the progression of tension and 
its outcome; a reality that exists in movement and gesture, in the individual’s particular 
emotional universe, sensations, and entire existential consciousness.
 Music education’s main concern, as Nielsen sees it, is communication between music 
and people. He suggests that the focus of music education is not always as clear as it could 
be when it comes to communicating from all music’s layers of meaning to the human 
consciousness. There is an inclination to look away from the profundity to be found in 
musical objects, and much educational activity appears to concentrate on bringing pupils 
into contact with ‘the externals of music’ – the features that are readily described in technical 
terms. 
 It is legitimate to ask whether the existential qualities of music in the human 
consciousness have been suppressed, marginalised, or rendered mute, and whether as such 
they are something we as researchers, following in Michel Foucault’s footsteps, should 
bring to light. This is certainly my intention in what follows, bringing Small’s existential 
‘musicking’ and Nielsen’s multi-faceted lifeworld to bear on musical experience as an 
existential experience.
 In approaching the term ‘existential experience’, it occurs to me that even though 
we as academics may have mastered a mode of speaking appropriate to the field and the 
times, and even though we work in a discipline that is now fairly well established, although 
granted we constantly question its design, it still seems as if our modes of expression, the 
way we think about musical learning, and our questions about music teaching and learning 
and even music itself, reach a threshold that we cannot cross (Guldbrandsen & Varkøy 
2004:7). Language fails us. The question then becomes what it is in this field we seldom 
manage to speak of. Or is it perhaps that we do not really want to say anything about it, 
and therefore remain silent? What has been marginalised? What is it we so rarely hold up 
for academic analysis? I would argue that in many circumstances it appears to be actual 
musical experience – a possibility only reinforced if we recognise that this is not least an 
existential experience.
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 There may be several reasons for the distance often evident in music education research 
when it comes to musical experience. One hypothesis is that it is simply the fact that, in 
the instant we turn our attention towards it, we have to deal with something that cannot 
be described technically and is unmanageable (Nielsen 1994:140). Another is that we are 
fearful of being bogged down in a quagmire of arguments over values and ideological 
contradictions, over philosophical, social, and personal identity constructs. This is not to 
say that there is broad agreement about what it means to have a musical experience – in an 
existential sense. Indeed, the question of existential experience rapidly leads to a variety 
of fundamental discussions. 
 A third hypothesis is that we live in a culture in which problematic questions about 
the meaning of life are often evaded as too disquieting. Certainly, when we do dare to 
touch upon the theme, it is only ever other people’s experiences that are discussed. It is 
very rarely, if ever, that I have found academics to give an account of their own musical, 
existential experiences, demonstrating the self-reflectivity we might otherwise expect 
from qualified researchers of music education. When we do mention the idea – to attack 
it, or to talk about other people’s experiences – it is often on the basis of identity theory 
or culture theory (Ruud 1997), or in relation to a psychological approach (Gabrielsson 
2008). An approach based on philosophy or music philosophy is more rare, at least in 
the field of music education research. It is precisely for this reason I will attempt to shed 
light on musical experience as an existential experience by linking it to philosophy and 
music philosophy, and more specifically to the writings of the Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Johan Vetlesen, with Hegel and Gadamer as points of reference (Vetlesen 2004). 
Vetlesen’s existence-oriented slant on musical experience is an interesting complement to 
the perspectives to be gleaned from sociology, culture theory, and psychology – if, that is, 
we take music education seriously as a multi-disciplinary discipline, and music seriously 
as a multi-faceted lifeworld. 
 Vetlesen’s thinking, like Frede Nielsen’s, tackles the encounter between music 
and people obliquely. This is a story of the meeting of affective power and affect; 
of music and people. Initially, Vetlesen claims that having an experience generally 
involves being astonished, startled, affected. An ‘experience’ is something that pushes 
us beyond our boundaries; we are shaken out of our usual patterns, and experience our 
subject-selves from unfamiliar angles. Gadamer (1960) says that the real experience 
is the one where we become aware of our own finiteness. This sense of finiteness 
communicates simultaneously our historicality. Every single ‘experience’ therefore 
becomes a kind of ‘painful experience’, and in this sense can be taken up and repeated 
over and over again: there will be time for everything, and everything returns. In this 
way we are brought into contact with the significant dimensions of human existence; 
we can perhaps say that ultimately it amounts to the experience of having only limited 
control over the world. ‘Painful’ in this context is not to be read literally, then; rather 
it should be interpreted as something akin to the ‘truth’, although that too can be more 
than painful in its turn.
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 But what place does music have in this? According to Vetlesen, it appears that musical 
experience is particularly suited to bring us into contact with the basic conditions of our 
lives. These basic conditions, or existential problems, encompass dependency, vulnerability, 
mortality, the fragility of relationships, and existential loneliness, and as such are linked 
to the question of meaning. These are the terms by which we live our lives, terms that we 
have not chosen, and that we cannot choose to abandon. They are the frames of our human 
existence – and we must all live within them. 
 In many ways it seems as if we live in a culture where mastery, authority, and 
achievement are the ideals in our lives. Everything that reminds us of dependency, 
vulnerability, or mortality is regarded as unwelcome, as a source of discomfort; they are 
things to be defeated or to be put behind us. Vetlesen argues, for instance, that today’s 
culture is resolutely ignorant of the terms that frame our lives. What awaits us in the 
musical experience as an existential experience requires that we put aside our culture’s 
knee-jerk concealment of the essential human condition, problematic or not. When I get 
shivers down my back, when my hair stands on end, when I go alternately hot and cold, 
when my pulse races, when my mood changes, then music has brought me into contact 
with one or several of these basic conditions (see Pio 2009, Pio & Varkøy 2009). This is no 
more mystical than experiencing any encounter where something happens to me without 
my planning it or being able to control it. Taking most things for granted, counting on the 
future as a repetition of the past, unthinkingly certain we are in control; the usual attitudes 
fall short. And when the usual does not materialise, and on the contrary something 
unexpected and completely different happens, I am forced to problematise myself and 
my life – that is, if I dare or want to reflect on it. 
 This is where music has its effect. The moment I am jolted out of what is familiar, 
controlled and controllable, chosen and planned, I become aware of my own vulnerability 
and insignificance in the world, and therefore of my own general dependency, vulnerability, 
and mortality, my loneliness and the fragility of my relationships. I am reminded of my 
own limits as a human being, and thus of the forgotten depths to the world. The notion 
of ‘depth’ is interesting, particularly if we view it in the light of psychological research 
on so-called ‘peak experiences’ (Gabrielsson 2008). Unsurprisingly, when Vetlesen 
focuses on dependency, vulnerability, mortality, and the like he is very easily understood 
as ‘depressing’ and ‘negative’, especially in a culture which finds such terms to be a source 
of unease. In an existential perspective, is this really what music is all about? What of 
peak experiences that convey joy, pleasure, beauty, fulfilment, and meaning? Music as 
an existential experience of course touches on such aspects of life as well. However, I 
would argue that experiences of meaning, including joy, pleasure, and fulfilment, need 
to have the ‘frightening and disturbing’ questions of mortality, loneliness, and so on as 
a counterpoint, if we want our search for meaning in our lives to be more than a purely 
hedonistic project (see Aristotle 1999, Varkøy 2003:119ff. for discussions of hedonism 
and eudaimonia, the Aristotelian definition of happiness). To put it briefly: no ‘depths’, no 
real ‘peaks’. I think it behoves us to link musical experience as an existential experience to 
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the dialectic relationships between joy, fulfilment, and the experience of ‘living here and 
now’ on the one side, and the existential frames of human life on the other. The meeting 
between a strong musical experience and a sense of my own finiteness could in fact be 
said to be the crux of the existential experience.
 When a musical experience wrenches us from our usual course, Vetlesen terms the 
state we attain as transcendence. We lift our gaze from own narrow compass and draw 
in the qualities of the music that have the potential to overwhelm us, perhaps even to 
bring about a change in our way of understanding ourselves in relation to the world. We 
shift our focus from the individual experiencing music per se to the encounter between 
the individual experiencing the music and the music itself. Transcendence can only be 
accomplished in the meeting between the subject and the object encountered; crucially, 
I can only be affected by what moves me; only music to which I am sufficiently open 
and receptive can realise its full potential. This may sound obvious, but it is none the 
less fundamental for that. We are once again back with music’s different layers and the 
analogous layers of human consciousness: music’s ability to affect must be matched with 
my own ability (or desire) to be affected, for in the absence of one or other, no experience 
can take place. An existential experience does not come about automatically – only 
if I am exposed to a certain piece of music. Nor is it much help to have an extensive 
theoretical and conceptual schooling in that music if that is all it amounts to, because 
for an existential experience I must also be in a state of listening readiness. In this way, 
all existential experience is linked to the subject’s openness, to my readiness or open 
disposition. But equally, all lack of existential experience, all non-experience, can of 
course be seen in terms of the relationship between music’s potential and the opposite 
of openness, perhaps best described as reticence.
 Thus far I have discussed what can happen in an encounter between music’s power to 
affect and individuals who are willing and able to be affected. What, then, of the music that 
can affect us? As a brief example, I suggest considering the views of someone at the sharp 
end, one of the leading Norwegian composers of my generation, Asbjørn Schaathun, and 
in particular his reflections on the musical elements and effects he believes are decisive 
for whether music can ‘leave the ground’, in the sense of communicating something that 
lies ‘beyond’ the score. One of his main points is how the conscious use of ambiguity on 
one or more levels, even in isolated musical statements, can open a mental room where 
music alludes to something that lies beyond. Schaathun (2004) identifies a range of 
criteria in order for this to happen, and argues that at least some of them must be present 
if music is to be able to convey an experience of richness, of an intricate ‘something’ 
that is greater than the sum of its parts. The criteria include hybridising, suspension, and 
hidden contexts; on every level it is about seeking out an ambiguous musical form. The 
obvious protest is that Schaathun’s views are contextually linked to the Western art 
music tradition. This need not detain us, however, since Schaathun is only used here as 
an example of how its practitioners think about music – given that we as music education 
researchers want music to have a role in music education research. 
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 Similarly, what does it mean when I write about individuals being willing and able 
to be affected? The truth is that I cannot automatically undergo an existential experience 
merely by being exposed to a musical work that it is hoped will have the power to move. 
The experience depends upon my listening readiness, my openness, or my receptiveness. 
This is as true of musical experience as it is of the educational encounter between pupil, 
teacher, and teaching material (Varkøy 2007).
 The dimensions to life I can meet in a musical existential experience largely evade 
language. Of course, by the same token, it is difficult to approach such experiences through 
language. It may even seem to be a contradiction to frame in language something that 
comes ‘before language’ (see, for example, Kjerschow 2000). That said, the objection to 
impossibility of operating with something that ‘comes before language’ is obvious. Have 
we not learned that ‘beyond language there is nothing’? And something cannot be ‘beyond 
language’ if we are already able to talk about it? It is quite correct that language plays an 
immense role in constituting our reality, and this is equally true of music through all the 
linguistic twists and turns in twentieth-century philosophy, whether we talk about analytic 
language philosophy, philosophic hermeneutics, or post-structuralism. Yet we still try to 
put into words experiences that are at the limits of language. This is something of which 
the many schools of thought are aware, naturally; indeed, aesthetic research and interpretive 
musicology set out to express through language partially non-verbal experiences. If anything 
is an academic discipline, it is this: to aspire express the inexpressible; to make all that is 
unconscious, unacknowledged, and non-verbalised conscious; and simultaneously to 
exercise humility in the face of the problematic, yes even at times ‘impossible’, nature of 
the project. It may seem as if the choice of language is central in this context. When musical 
experience also contains traces of ‘before-language characteristics’, it will be necessary 
for music education research to look to aesthetic research and interpretive musicology, 
and to resist the temptation to limit its range to the languages of psychology, sociology, 
or culture theory, for example. This should not be taken to mean that these languages are 
incorrect or ‘wrong’, yet in insisting on music education research’s multi-disciplinary 
character we also need to cast the net wider if we are to foster a multi-faceted discussion 
and understanding of musical experience.
The completely different
In any discussion of music’s role in music education research, I think it important to highlight 
the fundamental view of musical experience as an existential experience as something that 
holds good for everyone, even music education researchers. There is a general trend in 
educational and cultural policy towards reductionism when it comes to musical experiences, 
a reductionism that seems to exclude any thought of existential experience. The term 
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‘reductionism’ is used here to describe the attempt to explain a complex phenomenon 
by referring to only one or few perspectives (Gustavsson 2000). Equally, when discussing 
musical experience, the reductionism evident in music education research reflects a 
general unconcern over the fact that music education on the ground, just like educational 
and cultural policy on music’s role in people’s lives, shows only the smallest interest in 
focusing on all sides of the musical experience, including existential experience; but not 
least, this reductionism reflects the tendency to assess musical experiences primarily, if 
not exclusively, as harmonising and ‘edifying’ experiences. According to Immanuel Kant 
(1981 [1790], Varkøy 2003:176ff.), aesthetic convictions can arise from both ‘the beautiful’ 
and ‘the sublime’. The experience of the beautiful is a comfortable and harmonising 
experience. The experience of the sublime, however, is not. It is about being overwhelmed 
by a ‘vast might’ – and thus can be shattering. In short, sublime music gets hold of me, 
unnerves me, steers me towards unknown depths, or leaves me pondering the vulnerability 
of existence. What I have termed ‘existential experience’ in many ways hinges on an 
experience of the sublime. Given that both the educational and cultural discourses are 
permeated with the certainty of the harmonising effect of art – about the effects of ‘the 
beautiful’, to use Kant’s words – then there is not much place for ‘the sublime’, for art’s 
disturbing and disconcerting potential, for existential experience. We are faced with what 
is best termed a reductionist attitude to musical experience.
 It is striking that Kant was thinking about ‘the beautiful’ in an age when music was 
typified by the classical Viennese ideals of harmony and symmetry; in other words, the 
age of Haydn, Mozart, and early Beethoven. To borrow from Nietzsche (2000), we can 
perhaps say that it was primarily an ‘Apollonian’ musical age. Nietzsche uses ‘Apollonian’ 
and ‘Dionysian’ for two central principles in Greek culture. All types of form or structure 
are Apollonian, as is rational thought. Drunkenness and madness are Dionysian, as are all 
forms of enthusiasm and ecstasy. Music, according to Nietzsche, is the most Dionysian 
of the arts, since it appeals directly to man’s instinctive, chaotic emotions and not to his 
formally reasoning mind (see Pio 2009). However, since then a fair amount of music of 
a more ‘Dionysian’ character has flowed through history, starting with Beethoven’s later 
works and becoming a flood in the romantic period (in particular, in late romanticism and 
expressionism), while today, for example, we meet it in a range of rock music expressions. 
The problem as I see it is as follows: on the one hand we live today in a musical culture 
that in many ways can be said to be characterised by an existential imprint – perhaps just 
as suitable for ‘sublime experiences’ as ‘experiences of beauty’. I would argue that this is 
true both of the musical expressions current in popular music and of the function of music 
in people’s lives, for example in identity construction (Ruud 1997). On the other hand, at 
the same time we can see the reductionist approach in educational and cultural policy on 
musical experience, fixed on ‘far from dangerous harmony’. These are just some of the 
avenues open to music education research projects that choose to focus on music.
 Finally, if we want to problematise reductionism by analysing musical experience 
as an existential experience in the manner outlined above, it calls for more than a bare 
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description of music as an outer, sounding object. An existential experience, as we have 
seen, is a relationship – a meeting between the music as sound and the listening mind 
that receives it. Furthermore, the listening mind accommodates more than just perception 
and cognition in technical terms. As already noted, an existential experience is something 
to which we are exposed. It appears at certain, rare moments as a disturbing encounter 
with something outside ourselves. There is an old expression in Latin for this: mysterium 
tremendum et fascinans, the fearful and fascinating mystery that leaves us quaking with 
fright and rapture in the face of what the Germans call das ganz Andere (‘the completely 
different’). It is about experiences that throughout time have had religious, metaphysical, 
psychological, social, cultural, and aesthetic interpretations. It is the very variety of possible 
interpretations of musical experience that I wish to emphasise – and their validity in music 
education research. Music education research must approach musical experience with 
as much breadth as possible, aware of the conscious willpower and rationality involved, 
but also the sensual, emotional, personal, and existential qualities. If we as music 
education researchers really want to focus on music, we are obliged to acknowledge 
the full magnitude of this multi-faceted lifeworld.
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